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Abstract
How do decision-makers in the judiciary approach children’s capacities as set out in 
Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child? Children in public care who 
cannot be reunified with their birth parents may be adopted, but are children given 
agency in these cases that are highly important to the involved children? We examine 
all judgments on adoptions from care made in Norway in a six-year period (2011-2016) 
involving children aged 4-17 years old, a total of 169 judgments. These cases are decided 
after a two- to three-day hearing in the court-like County Board. The results of our 
analysis are discouraging because many children are absent in the decision-maker’s 
justification and conclusion about adoption. Young children do not have their capacity 
assessed, and older children’s capacity undergoes a shallow assessment at best, and 
typically only their opinion is mentioned. Age is commonly used as a proxy for compe-
tency and maturity, and the role children’s opinion plays in the cases as well as in the 
decision-making is unclear overall. Possible explanations for this situation may be lack 
of guidelines for how to give children agency, that decision-makers do not have suffi-
cient competency in assessing children’s capabilities, and/or that decision-makers are 
not aware of their obligations or are not willing to give children agency.
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1 Introduction
Boy (12) has expressed his views in the case, … He wants to be adopted, 
and his wish will be assigned considerable weight, … He has been preoc-
cupied with his belonging to the foster home since he was 4–5 years old. 
There is no information about the boy’s functioning or maturity, nor in 
the case otherwise, that would indicate that he doesn’t understand what 
an adoption entails (NA44).
This excerpt illustrates a decision-maker’s consideration of a boy’s capacities 
and his opinion about being adopted from care. The cognitive functioning of 
the boy is emphasised, combined with his long-standing concern about be-
longing in the family. These factors, as well as others, are not uncommon for 
decision-makers to assess when considering if an opinion is rational and 
should be given weight (Archard and Skivenes, 2009, 2009a; Le Grand and New, 
2015). However, it is difficult for decision-makers to assess when and how a 
child should participate in his or her own case, as much research has revealed 
(see for example Gal and Duramy, 2015; Magnussen and Skivenes, 2015; Porter, 
2019).
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 (crc) 
clarifies in Article 5 that states should ensure and protect children’s right to be 
involved in decisions that concern them, from the earliest possible age, in rec-
ognising parents’ and others’ rights and responsibilities to give: ‘… in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention.’ The presumption in the crc is that children are capable of being 
involved in matters of importance to them (GC 12, para. 20; Varadan, 2019). The 
right to express their views is accorded to all children ‘capable of forming his or 
her own views’ (crc, Article 12). Thus, children shall have a form of agency in 
matters concerning them, which starts with the presumption that they have 
the capacity to participate and to make and to express their views, and that 
exceptions must be justified. It follows from the rights perspective that it is the 
child’s capacities that should set the threshold for the child’s ability to form an 
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opinion. Furthermore, it is an obligation to enable children to participate and 
be involved in matters concerning them, and in terms of giving due weight to 
a child’s view or opinion, it is an obligation to assign increasing weight in ac-
cordance with the child’s capacities and maturity.
For decision-makers in courts or public administration, the crc provides 
clear directions on how to proceed. The crux is to interpret what is meant by 
capacities and to identify the capacity of a specific child. Developmental psy-
chology provides us with general insight into children’s abilities, although 
there are different schools of thought (Smith et al., 2015; Miller, 2016). The typi-
cal proxy for children’s competency and abilities is age. At age 18 years, an indi-
vidual is by definition an adult, and by age 15 and 12 years, children in many 
states are defined as being capable of making certain decisions or their views 
should be given great weight. Although using age as a marker for competency 
in some areas makes sense, it is not recommended by the crc committee 
(GC 12, para. 21) because it becomes a crutch and decision-makers fail to fulfil 
their obligation to assess each individual child’s capabilities (see Magnussen 
and Skivenes, 2015; Hultman et al., 2019).1 In decisions and matters of direct 
concern for a child, it is clear that the ability to form an opinion is the criterion 
and the threshold that shall be met as to whether to involve a child.
In this paper, we examine decisions that are of direct concern and impor-
tance for children, namely decisions in which the judiciary must decide if a 
child should be adopted from care or continue their stay in public care. These 
decisions are made after a two- to three-day hearing involving all legal parties 
concerned by the decision. Typically, only children above 15 years old are pres-
ent in the hearing, and younger children may have a spokesperson, and/or 
speak with a psychologist or social worker. It is the County Board’s responsibil-
ity to ensure that all relevant information is included in the case (Section 19-6 
of The Dispute Act 2005). We are curious to find out how the Norwegian system 
involves and includes the child when making these decisions. We have exam-
ined all judgments made by the County Social and Child Welfare Boards 
(County Board)2 in the period 2011–2016 in Norway in which the child is four 
years or older (n=179 children, n=169 cases). We first identified if the County 
1 This does not mean that age should never be used as a proxy for competency, as discussed by, 
for example, Archard (2015). Setting an age limit for when a person can apply for a driver’s 
licence is efficient and cost effective.
2 Norway has a unitary court system, and establishment of the Social County Board in 1994 
constituted an anomaly because the County Board is a “court-like” decision-making body. 
However, the County Boards are considered a “court” according to echr, Art. 6 due to its 
independent position and procedural guarantees. See Skivenes and Søvig (2017) and Skivenes 
and Tonheim (2016) for details of the County Board’s working methods.
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Boards considered the child’s competency by assessing his or her ability to 
form an opinion or view about the matter at stake. If yes, what factors do the 
County Boards rely on? Second, we identify if the County Boards have pre-
sented the child’s view and, if yes, what this view is and how it is interpreted. 
Third, we analyse if and how the County Boards assign weight to the child’s 
opinion.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section, crc, Articles 5 
and 12 are outlined. Thereafter, the theme of adoption from care and the 
 Norwegian decision-making system are presented. Following that, the legal 
platform and theories of what promotes and hinders children’s involvement 
are presented, including an overview of research on children’s involvement in 
adoption proceedings. A section on methodological approach, data material 
and ethical approvals follows. We then present findings, followed by a discus-
sion section and concluding remarks.
2 Evolving Capacities – Rights and Theory
2.1 Evolving Capacities
Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is titled, “Parental guid-
ance and the child’s evolving capacities” and reads as follows:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents 
or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as 
provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally respon-
sible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capaci-
ties of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the 
child of the rights recognised in the present Convention.
For our purposes, we are concerned with the concept of children’s evolving 
capacities, and in one of the few discussions of the concept, unicef 2005, 
three interlinked strands are identified: (1) the developmental dimension of 
the convention, (2) the participatory/emancipatory dimension, (3) the protec-
tive concept of evolving capacities. These are presented as conceptual frame-
works through which the concept should be understood and examined. The 
participatory/emancipatory dimension is especially interesting for our pur-
poses because it imposes on states a duty to respect the rights of children to 
have their capacities recognised in accordance with their level of compe-
tence, and to shift the level of responsibility for the exercise of rights from par-
ents to children accordingly (Landsdown, 2005: 15). In this respect, we cannot 
mention Article 5 without Article 12 of the crc, on the child’s right to be 
heard, which likewise establishes children as agents with autonomy, with the 
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right to participate in matters affecting them (see also Archard and Skivenes, 
2009). Varadan (2019) suggests that the concept of evolving capacities has been 
 treated as (1) an enabling principle, (2) an interpretive principle, and (3) a pol-
icy principle (Varadan, 2019: 11). In terms of being an enabling principle, the 
concept of evolving capacities serves four functions: (1) affirming children as 
rights holders and recognising their increased capacity and agency as they 
grow, (2) supporting children’s agency in decision-making, (3) recognising that 
all – even very young – children should be engaged in the exercise and promo-
tion of their own rights, (4) clarifying the duties of parents and legal guardians 
in supporting and guiding their children’s enjoyment of their own rights under 
the crc (Varadan, 2019: 317).
We find two main messages from the literature on Article 5 of the crc to be 
of particular importance: first, the imperative to move away from age as deter-
minant but rather focusing on capacity (Landsdown, 2005). As discussed else-
where (for example Archard, 2005; Archard and Skivenes, 2009; Daly, 2018), age 
as a proxy for a linear progressive development in terms of maturity and com-
petency to apply equally to all children is highly problematic. Following the 
crc, decision-makers in adoption proceedings have an obligation to assess 
each child’s ability to form an opinion and make sure the child is involved ac-
cordingly in the proceedings.
Second, the rights of children are the same, but their needs and capacities 
vary (Landsdown, 2005). The balance to be struck is recognising children as 
autonomous rights holders with respect to their relative capacity, without ex-
posing them to responsibilities prematurely. It needs also to be said that evolv-
ing capacities is not about rights as such, rather, it concerns the exercise of 
rights, and where the responsibility to do so lies (Landsdown, 2005). While the 
concept recognises children as active agents with autonomy, it also recognises 
their need for protection, and how competency and the need for protection will 
vary between children and situations, and evolve as children grow both with 
age and life experience. A summary of how to think about children’s involve-
ment, which we concur with, is laid out in a piece by Archard and Skivenes:
… we do not seek the views of the child simply in order to demonstrate 
the child’s possible competence to decide for himself or herself; nor only 
so that they might play a consultative role in helping adult decision- 
makers judge what is in the overall best interests of the child. We think 
that the expression by a child able to do so of his or her views has inde-
pendent value as an essential element in the decision-making process. 
The value derives from the fundamental respect a child is owed as a dis-
tinct individual in that process (Archard and Skivenes, 2009: 392).
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Moving forward from this platform, the question is how children may be 
barred from involvement and how they can be involved in decision-making.
2.1.1 Barriers for involving Children
There are several reasons why decision-makers in the child welfare service and 
in courts do not involve children adequately. We do not have systematic re-
search knowledge about this, but some explanations do emerge. In Skivenes 
(2018), five barriers for decision-makers that hinder the involvement of chil-
dren are presented. The first one is about decision-makers’ (and adults’) desire 
to protect children from potential re-traumatisation and from reliving pain 
they have experienced. Furthermore, decision-makers do not want to place the 
child in a difficult conflict of loyalty, or further burden the child. They have 
thoughts of the child as vulnerable, and that they should not give the child ad-
ditional experiences they cannot handle. Second, many decision-makers be-
lieve that children do not have sufficient ability and maturity to get involved or 
to have reasonable perceptions about a case or the matters at stake. Third, 
there may be a perception among decision-makers that it does not matter to 
the decision whether the child participates. If the risk to the child is consid-
ered high, the decision-makers may think that one must do what is necessary – 
regardless of what the child thinks. Fourth, decision-makers lack the compe-
tence and training in talking about difficult and sensitive issues with children. 
Finally, fifth, there are not sufficient organisational structures or bureaucratic 
case management rules for involving children, and the decision-makers may 
have high time pressure and physical surroundings designed for interacting 
with adults (see Skivenes, 2018 for details; cf. also Hultman et al., 2019). The first 
three barriers are about individual features and attitudes, whereas the final 
two barriers are about structures for building competence through education 
and training, as well as in organisations.
2.1.2 Involving Children in Decision-making
A child can be involved in various ways: directly if the child provides oral testi-
mony or submits a written statement, or indirectly through the intermediary 
of an adult such as a specially trained legal advocate or a relevant professional. 
Clearly, in any interaction with children, one seeks the child’s authentic voice 
and decision-making must be a deliberative process, in the sense that argu-
ments and new information will influence decision-makers’ opinions and con-
siderations (Archard and Skivenes, 2009, 2009a). As much scholarship has 
demonstrated, children are involved in many ways, some experience real in-
volvement, while some are on the opposite end, experiencing tokenism or sim-
ply exclusion (Hart, 1992; Shier, 2001).
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Involvement of children (and any person for that matter) in decision- 
making aiming to withstand rational critique (see Habermas, 1981; Eriksen and 
Weigård, 2004; Archard and Skivenes, 2009; Magnussen and Skivenes, 2015), 
must ensure that all participants involved in the case must be given the oppor-
tunity to participate. There must be an appropriate location for the presenta-
tion of opinions and arguments, and important differences between the par-
ticipants in their ability to articulate a point of view, advance a claim or 
understand the terms of the case should be compensated. The decision- making 
process should be transparent so that everyone participating hears everything 
that everyone else has to say, and the process must be accountable to avoid 
peculiar customs and illegitimate arguments. In the methods section, we op-
erationalise how to identify children’s involvement in a written judgment, but 
first, we will address the scholarship on adoptions from care and children’s in-
volvement, followed by an outline of the Norwegian system on adoptions from 
care and the research available on this theme.
2.2 Children’s Involvement in Adoption Proceedings
There is huge variation across European countries in their legal regulation of 
children’s involvement in adoption proceedings, and the revised European 
Convention on the Adoption of Children (2008)3 states that if the child’s con-
sent is required, the age should not be set higher than 14 years (Article 5(1)b). 
Some countries in Europe, for example Switzerland and Ukraine, do not oper-
ate with an age limit, but solely require an assessment of the child’s capacities 
to consent or not. In some countries, for example England, Ireland and Austria, 
the child’s consent or lack thereof is at no point legally determinative (Fenton-
Glynn, 2013).
Although the crc does not set as an obligation that the child should deter-
mine to be adopted or not (Fenton-Glynn, 2013: 593), it is clear that it is an ob-
ligation that states hear the child’s opinion and give it due weight according to 
age and competency. While states vary greatly in how they regulate this, age as 
a proxy for competency is widespread throughout Europe. Thirty European 
countries use only age to determine if consent to an adoption is necessary: age 
10 years in, for example, Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia; age 11 years in Malta; 
age 12 years in, for example, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain; age 13 years in Po-
land and France; age 14 years in, for example, Germany and Italy; and age 15 
years in, for example, Monaco (see Fenton-Glynn, 2013: 594-5 for a full over-
view). Some countries – Finland, Hungary and the Netherlands – have chosen 
3 Ratified by 11 countries (in 2019): Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Ukraine.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/02/2020 07:30:26AM
via University of Bergen
 639Children’s Capacities and Role
<UN>
international journal of children’s rights 28 (2020) 632-665
a  combination of an age limit that can be deviated from if a younger child is 
found mature and competent. Other countries, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and 
the Czech Republic, allow for dispensing of the requirement of consent from 
the child at a set age, based on a best interests’ consideration (Fenton-Glynn, 
2013). In Norway, the country from which we have empirical material, a child 
must consent to adoption if 12 years or older.
To our knowledge, there is little research on children’s position and views 
in  cases about child protection adoptions or other types of adoptions (see 
 Helland and Skivenes, 2019). Tregeagle et al. (2019) recently published a study 
on the adverse childhood experiences of vulnerable children adopted from 
care in Australia. Palacios and a wide interdisciplinary group of researchers 
(2019) argue that adoption is an important and legitimate model for care of 
children when made within a rights-and-ethics framework that emphasises 
children’s best interests. Two studies directly address children adopted from 
care, Berg (2010) interviewed 12 children adopted from care in Norway about 
their experiences, but this did not relate to court proceedings. Thomas et al. 
(1999) interviewed 41 children adopted from care in England, and they were 
also asked about the court proceedings. This study shows that half of the chil-
dren were concerned about the court proceedings, both in terms of the actual 
court hearing and meeting a judge and being in the court-room, but also wor-
ries about the outcome of the proceeding and if the judge would, for example, 
say no to an adoption and what would happen then (69). The long waiting pe-
riod before the court hearing was also mentioned as difficult for about half of 
the children (70 ff). In conclusion, questions about if and how children are in-
volved, whether children provide their consent, whether children have views 
on foster home versus adoption as a placement alternative, if children have a 
view on their contact with the birth family, are to a large degree left unan-
swered (Helland and Skivenes, 2019). There is research on children’s involve-
ment in child protection cases in general and also on legal proceedings, such as 
the Norwegian Expert by Experience group, the Change Factory, which has 
 collected information from 130 children (Expert by Experience Report, 2019). 
We return to these findings in the discussion section.
3 Background – Adoption from Care in the Norwegian Child 
Protection System
Research on Norwegian adoption cases is scarce. In Norway, around 50 chil-
dren are adopted from care each year and about 8,000 children are at any given 
day placed out of home due to a care order. A general outline of adoption from 
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care in Norway is presented in Skivenes and Thoburn (2016) and in Helland 
and Skivenes (2019; in press).4 Adoption from care is regulated by the Norwe-
gian Child Welfare Act 1992 (section 4-20) as well as the Adoption Act 2017 
(section 12, second sentence). The Child Welfare Act states in Section 4-20, 
 Deprival of parental responsibility. Adoption, that:
If the county social welfare board has made a care order for a child, the 
county social welfare board may also decide that the parents shall be de-
prived of all parental responsibility. If, as a result of the parents being 
deprived of parental responsibility, the child is left without a guardian, 
the county social welfare board shall as soon as possible take steps to 
have a new guardian appointed for the child.
When an order has been made depriving the parents of parental responsibility, 
the county social welfare board may give its consent for a child to be adopted 
by persons other than the parents.
Consent may be given if:
a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently un-
able to provide the child with proper care or the child has become so at-
tached to persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on 
the basis of an overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious 
problems for him or her; and
b) adoption would be in the child’s best interests and
c) the adoption applicants have been the child’s foster parents and have 
shown themselves fit to bring up the child as their own and
d) the conditions for granting an adoption pursuant to the Adoption Act are 
fulfilled.
When the county social welfare board consents to adoption, the Ministry shall 
issue the adoption order (Section 4-20, Norwegian Child Welfare Act 1992).
Thus, the legislation provides for adoption of children placed in long-term 
public care, provided it is in the child’s best interests. Post-adoption contact 
with birth parents may be a formalised arrangement decided by the County 
Board (see Section 4-20 a). The legislator has assumed this contact to be limit-
ed, stipulated in extent by the decision-maker, and can only be granted if the 
adoptive applicants agree and it is considered in the child’s best interests.
4 An outline of the Norwegian child protection system can be found in Skivenes (2011) and 
Falch-Eriksen and Skivenes (2019), and details on various processes of child protection re-
movals are specified in Skivenes and Søvig (2017).
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3.1 County Board Proceedings
The child protection service prepares an application for an adoption from care, 
and the County Boards make the decision. The County Board typically consists 
of three decision-makers: a lawyer (the Board’s chair), an expert member and 
a lay member. The main principles for the proceedings and strict due process 
requirements are outlined in the Child Welfare Act of 1992, Section 7-3. Typi-
cally, decision-makers in adoption proceedings will have been provided with 
extensive written material by the public and private parties in the case. How-
ever, children are parties to the case only when they are 15 years or older (or 
younger if the case is due to the child’s own behaviour). There will be an in 
camera hearing of two to three days ensuring that all arguments are heard and 
addressed. The County Board has an obligation to ensure that, ‘an independent 
and genuine assessment of the basis for decision-making’ (Child Welfare Act 
of 1992, Section 7-3 e) is undertaken. The chair and the co-decision-makers 
meet after the last day of hearings, discuss the case, and make a decision. Typi-
cally, in adoption cases these decisions are unanimous (Helland and Skivenes, 
2019). The written judgment should be ready no later than two weeks after 
the hearing and must include all relevant reasons and arguments on which the 
County Board has based its decision. The written judgment will be around 
 10–15 pages long.
3.2 On Child Participation in Adoption Proceedings
In adoptions from care, the Norwegian Child Welfare Act 1992 sets out the gen-
eral rules of procedure. In accordance with Section 6-3 of the Act,
A child who has reached the age of 7, and younger children who are ca-
pable of forming their own opinions, shall receive information and be 
given an opportunity to state his or her opinion before a decision is made 
in a case affecting him or her (Section 6-3 first sentence, Norwegian Child 
Welfare Act 1992).
The law further specifies that, ‘Importance shall be attached to the opinion of 
the child in accordance with his or her age and maturity’ (section 6-3 second 
sentence). The Adoption Act (section 9, second paragraph) also sets out re-
quirements on children’s participation in adoption proceedings, largely echo-
ing that of the Child Welfare Act Section 6-3. However, the Adoption Act (ibid.) 
further specifies that children aged 12 years or older can only be adopted with 
their consent. This does not apply, however, if the child, due to mental disabil-
ity or physical or mental illness, is clearly not able to understand what consent 
entails. The requirement of consent from children aged 12 years or older was 
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also stated in the previous adoption law of 1986 (Norwegian Adoption Act 
1986, section 6-2), which was repealed by the 2017 legislation.
The requirements for children’s involvement are further anchored in the 
Norwegian Constitution §104, which states that children – regardless of age – 
have the right to be heard in questions relating to them and, in so doing, con-
sideration should be had to their age and development. Moreover, the Norwe-
gian Children Act 1981 (section 31) sets out children’s right of co-determination, 
providing that children who are able to form their own point of view in matters 
that concern them shall have their opinion considered before someone makes 
a decision on their personal situation. This Act echoes the guiding age of seven 
years, stating (ibid.) that, ‘A child who has reached the age of seven and younger 
children who are able to form their own points of view must be provided with 
information and opportunities to express their opinions’, and ‘When the child 
has reached the age of 12, the child’s opinion shall carry significant weight.’
Thus, it is clear that children’s involvement is extensively and cohesively 
provided for in Norwegian legislation concerning adoption from care. The Nor-
wegian legislation does not set out a strict age limit as such, rather, a combina-
tion of age, capacity and maturity is to be considered when assessing whether 
the child should be involved, i.e. receive information and state their opinion. 
However, age is important because the ages 7 and 12 years are key in assessing 
the maturity of the child. While age 12 years is an absolute age limit for con-
sent, with only limited exceptions, age 7 years is worded as a guiding age; chil-
dren above this age should be heard, while children below this age may be 
heard, all the while assessing their capabilities. The law does not specify the 
issue of consent for children below the age of 12 years, rather, the law provides 
an obligation to involve the child, not a duty placed on the child that she or he 
should have to decide on the outcome.
In County Board proceedings, children will not be directly involved in the 
proceedings unless they are a party to the case at age 15 years and older. This 
means the decision-makers in the County Board do not meet the children, and 
they are dependent on the information provided by the parties in the case. 
A spokesperson may also speak with the child to identify the child’s view on 
the situation and give testimony before the County Board (in person or by vid-
eo conference). A spokesperson will typically meet with the child a couple of 
times for a few hours. In Enroos et al. (2017), details on the spokesperson sys-
tem are outlined, and a finding from this study is that the spokesperson ar-
rangement is not sufficiently resourced to provide for children’s involvement 
on their own standing (ibid.). The arrangement with a spokesperson is much 
used for children aged seven years and older, but rarely for children under sev-
en years (Magnussen and Skivenes, 2015).
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4 Methodological Approach
The study reported here is part of a larger project relating to decision-making 
in child protection, funded by Bufdir (The Norwegian Directorate for Children, 
Youth and Family Affairs) and the European Research Council. Detailed infor-
mation about ethical approvals and data collection procedures is available in 
Helland and Skivenes (2019). Permission to access the cases was given by The 
Norwegian Data Protection Authority and the Council for confidentiality and 
research, and the project is reported to Data Protection Services and the Uni-
versity of Bergen´s Ombudsman for Personal Data and Privacy. Only select 
named researchers could access the cases. Our data material consists of written 
judgments. We have examined all judgments on adoption from care decided by 
the County Boards over a six-year period (2011-2016). The written decisions are 
statements that consist of four parts: 1) an objective (non-contested) summary 
of the case, then 2) and 3) the two (usually) contested parts, each with a presen-
tation of the viewpoints and the arguments of the parties (public and pri-
vate), and 4) finally the County Board’s considerations and conclusion(s). The 
judgments are required to include all information and arguments relevant to 
the decision-maker’s decision (see Section 19-6 of the Dispute Act 2005; cf. 
Skivenes & Tonheim, 2017). Thus, if children have been assessed or their views 
have been considered, this should be evidenced in the County Board’s writ-
ten  justification of its decision (read more here: https://www.discretion.uib 
.no/wp- content/uploads/2019/10/FORMAL-LEGAL-REQUIREMENTS-FOR- 
JUDGMENTS-IN-CARE-ORDER-DECISIONS-IN-8-COUNTRIES.pdf). In the 
analysis of the data material we have only used the County Board’s consider-
ations and conclusion(s), each typically three to five pages, to examine if and 
how the child’s capacities and views have been considered by the decision- 
makers.
In the six-year period covered, a total of 283 cases have been decided on 
adoption from care, involving 302 children. For our study, we have included all 
cases with children between 4 and 17 years (n=169 cases and n=179 children), 
and excluded children who have not yet turned 4 years (n=122 children; n=120 
cases). We collected all the information about the children in these cases. Our 
research approval5 only allows us to keep a limited sample of cases for a longer 
period, and thus we deleted all cases for the years 2012-2015 after extracting 
the information about children in the case. Thus, we cannot review these cas-
es again, for example if we wish to extract new information. The reason we 
5 Please read here about storage of sensitive data material: https://www.discretion.uib.no/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SAFE-STORAGE-OF-CHILD-PROTECTION-JUDGMENTS-.pdf.
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excluded cases with children younger than four years is that we believed it 
likely that they would not be involved. To check if this assumption is true, we 
conducted a systematic check of all the cases with children below four years of 
age from the years 2011 and 2016 (the years we have full case material of all age 
levels). A total of 34 children were below the age of four years old, and in none 
of these cases was the child’s opinion mentioned, nor had the child been ap-
pointed a spokesperson. In two cases (both from 2016), there had been an as-
sessment of the child’s ability in the sense that it was stated that due to the 
children’s young age, their opinion would not be heard.
We used an analytical and conceptual strategy (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 
26) by gaining an overall impression of the County Board’s reasoning, and 
thereafter specifically identifying a) whether the child’s views and opinions are 
mentioned by the Board in its assessment; b) how much weight the Board will 
give the child’s views and opinions in its assessment (no weight, weight not 
mentioned, weight mentioned but unspecified how much, some, a lot); c) 
what the child’s opinion and view towards adoption is (positive, negative, neu-
tral). In Table 1 below, the codes and code descriptions are set out. To ensure 
the validity of the interpretations and categorisations, both researchers were 
involved in discussing and determining the codes, and one researcher was re-
sponsible for the coding. The text analysis program Nvivo 12 Pro was used for 
the coding process. The reliability of the coding was secured by a third person 
independently checking the coding. Only a few differences were detected, and 
these were discussed and then given a final code.
Table 1 Code descriptions
Whether the board assesses the child’s capabilities: Statements in which 
the County Board has assessed the child’s ability to form an opinion, or the 
child’s ability to be involved in the process. We also include here the indirect 
assessment of abilities, when an opinion is in fact included. We code “yes” if 
the child’s abilities are assessed by the board, “no” if not.
Whether the board mentions and presents the child’s views and opinions 
in the case: References to direct statements from the child to their spokes-
person, or indirect statements where the child has expressed their opinions 
to other persons (parents, foster parents, child welfare services etc.). We 
code “yes” if the child’s opinion is mentioned by the board, “no” if not.
Whether the board considers and relies on the child’s opinion in their 
decision: Includes statements from the County Board on whether they will 
assign weight to the child’s opinion in their decision. This can be direct 
statements from the board that they will or will not rely on the child’s
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Table 1 Code descriptions (cont.)
a There are nuances as, for example, reference to a repeated wish over the years could be 
interpreted as implicitly assigning weight. However, we do not stretch the interpretation on 
behalf of the County Board, and thus categorise this as not mentioned.
opinion, e.g. ‘the perhaps most important argument for adoption, in this 
case, is still the child’s clear and well-reflected wish to be adopted’.
Indirect statements may express an evaluation on the board’s part of the 
child’s opinion, such as, ‘the board considers that child X has not under-
stood what adoption implies’. We interpret this as the perception that the 
view is rightly held, implying it will not be relied upon by the board. We 
register results in the following six categories:
– Yes: the board indicates that the opinion is relied upon but there is no 
mention of the degree
– Yes – a lot: the board indicates that the opinion is relied upon and weighed 
heavily
– Yes – some: the board indicates that the opinion is relied upon to some 
extent
– Not mentioned: the opinion is merely mentioned by the board with no 
indication of whether it is relied upona
– No: the opinion is not relied upon, either by express statement or because 
the opinion is devalued by the board
– Not relevant: the opinion is not mentioned by the board
The child’s opinion towards adoption: Statements that describe what the 
child’s opinion towards adoption is, categorised according to positive, 
neutral, and negative.
– Positive: the child is positive towards adoption. This can be assessed either 
from direct statements, or indirect statements or actions.
– Direct statement: ‘the child has been heard in this case, as is stated above. 
He wants to be adopted and his wish will be assigned considerable weight’.
– Indirect statement: ‘the child has been preoccupied with not having the 
same last name as the foster parents, and she is very quick to point out spe-
cifically that she belongs to the foster family and is a part of the family’.
– Neutral: there is no indication of whether the child is positive or negative 
to adoption, or there is indication that the child is unsure.
– E.g. ‘the child did not have any opinions on what adoption entails, but did 
express that she belongs to the foster home and the network around them’.
– Negative: The child is negative or has doubts concerning adoption.
– E.g., ‘in her latest conversation with the spokesperson, the child expressed 
she did not want to be adopted if this means less contact with her father’.
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We use quotes to illustrate typical statements and findings from the mate-
rial. The quotes are de-identified, and we sometimes also alter gender to en-
sure anonymity. Cases are referred to by numbers, and we have ordered the 
cases in alphabetical and chronological order, starting at number 1 for the first 
case in 2011 (by alphabetical order) and number 169 for the last case in 2016. 
All translations from Norwegian to English were done by the authors and have 
been independently checked by a third person. In an online appendix, we 
have included additional findings for readers who have an interest in the de-
tails of the material: https://www.discretion.uib.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 
11/McEwan-Strand-Skivenes.-Childrens-Capacities.pdf.
There are limitations to our study. We do not learn if the children them-
selves feel they have been involved. Although our data material is comprehen-
sive, we have only examined the written judgments and do not have access to 
the full case files submitted to the County Boards. We do not know if the Coun-
ty Boards have included children or met with the children without this being 
mentioned in the judgments. However, our enquiries about this to the Coun-
ty  Boards indicate that this rarely happens. Our data collection procedure, 
 extracting information for a specific part of the judgments, hinders us check-
ing other parts of the judgment for 2012–2015. We experience this to be a limi-
tation in regard to the consent issue of the findings because the County Board 
may have mentioned this in the facts section, although we do not have reason 
to believe this has happened on a general basis.
5 Findings
The 179 children in our sample were on average 7 years old at the time of 
the  adoption and included 88 boys and 91 girls. A total of 171 (95 per cent) 
of the children were adopted. Most of the County Board decisions (163 out of 
169) were unanimous. The questions we address in the findings section are 
threefold. First, we examine if the County Boards have considered the child’s 
abilities to form an opinion or view about the matter at stake and, if so, what 
factors do the County Board rely on. Second, when the County Boards present 
the child’s opinion, what is the content of the child’s opinion, and how does 
the County Board interpret the opinion. Third, we examine if and how the 
County Board gives weight to the child’s opinion.
5.1 Ability to Form an Opinion?
The County Board undertook some form of assessment for half of the children 
(n=90), leaving 89 children excluded (see Table 2). Most of these children had 
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their opinion mentioned (n=73), and thus the County Board did not make an 
explicit assessment of their capacity to form an opinion. For only 17 children, 
the County Board undertook an assessment of the capacity of the children. Of 
these, none were deemed to have the ability to be involved or to have their 
opinion heard. Sixteen children were too young, according to the County 
Board, without any additional reason. These children were on average 4.3 years 
old (median age 4 years). For one of these children, the Board expresses what 
seems to be a direct misrepresentation of the law: ‘Child X is only four years 
old, meaning there is no requirement for her to be given the opportunity to 
provide her opinion in this case’ (NA153). However, the law requires an assess-
ment of a child’s abilities to form an opinion, regardless of age, as we have set 
out above. For one child (out of the 17 children) the County Board provides a 
reason for its assessment of the child’s capacity that is directly related to the 
specific child in the case: ‘It has been shown that Child X at this time is not able 
independently to form an opinion on whether or not he wants his foster par-
ents to adopt him’ (NA81).
Table 2 Children’s ability assessed or view included. N=179 children.
Child’s age Number of 
children
Ability assessed or child’s opinion included
Yes (N=) Yes (%) No (N=) No (%)
All ages 179 90 50% 89 50%
4 50 13 26% 37 74%
5 33 9 27% 24 73%
6 29 7 24% 22 76%
7 7 6 86% 1 14%
8 15 15 100% 0 0%
9 12 10 83% 2 17%
10 7 7 100% 0 0%
11 3 2 67% 1 33%
12 8 7 88% 1 12%
13 4 4 100% 0 0%
14 2 2 100% 0 0%
15 6 5 83% 1 17%
16 1 1 100% 0 0%
17 2 2 100% 0 0%
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For those 89 children who were absent from the County Boards’ consider-
ations, without a justification for this exclusion, most of the children (n=83) 
were between four and six years old, indicating that the County Board does not 
consider it a legal obligation to assess the abilities or listen to children below 
the age of seven years. Six of the excluded children ranged in age from 7 to 15 
years old. The 15-year-old did have legal representation in his/her case, but nev-
ertheless his/her opinion was not mentioned by the County Board in its assess-
ment. Furthermore, while children above the age of 12 years must consent to 
adoption, we see that for one of the 12-year-olds in this sample, the child’s 
opinion, views or consent are absent from the County Board’s reasoning. We 
return to the issue of consent below.
For seven children, the County Boards seem to consider the right to be in-
volved as negative for the child, as illustrated in these two quotes, both con-
cerning children aged four years old:
The boy has been too young to be involved in the process so far. In not too 
long, the boy will reach the age where the law requires that he has the 
right to be heard in any future proceedings. In the County Board’s opin-
ion, this right on behalf of the boy seems more like a disadvantage, rather 
than a benefit (NA135).
The mother has also stated that it might become natural with more con-
tact in future if the child wants to. It might, therefore, be important to 
consent to adoption before the child is at an age where she will need to 
be involved in the proceedings before the County Boards or courts 
(NA119).
According to the County Board in these cases, reaching an adoption deci-
sion before the child is old enough to be heard is positive, because it would 
protect the child against the insecurity of having to be involved in future 
processes.
5.2 Opinion included in the Judgments?
Around 40 per cent (n=73) of the children in the adoption judgments were 
considered to have the ability to form an opinion, whereas, for 59 per cent 
(n=106) of the children, there is no mention of the child’s view or opinion by 
the County Board. This is correlated with the age of the child because younger 
children’s views are mentioned to a lesser degree, see Table 3.
As can be seen from the table, most children aged seven years and above did 
have their opinion mentioned by the Board, with the exception of six children. 
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Table 3 Overview of children’s view reflected in judgment in adoption cases. N=179 
children
Child’s age Number  
of 
children
The opinion  
is included. 
N/%
The opinion  
is excluded. 
N/%
View is mentioned  
and given weight 
N=number of children
All children 179 73 41% 106 59% 53
4 50 1 2% 49 98% 1
5 33 4 12% 29 88% 3
6 29 7 24% 22 76% 3
7 7 6 86% 1 14% 1
8 15 15 100% 0 0% 9
9 12 10 83% 2 17% 8
10 7 7 100% 0 0% 7
11 3 2 67% 1 33% 2
12 8 7 88% 1 13% 5
13 4 4 100% 0 0% 4
14 2 2 100% 0 0% 2
15 6 5 83% 1 17% 5
16 1 1 100% 0 0% 1
17 2 2 100% 0 0% 2
Of these, three judgments made no reference to the views or opinions of the 
child at all (children aged 9, 11, and 12 years), and it would be difficult to point 
to any reason as to why their opinion would not be mentioned. In the case 
concerning a child aged 15 years, the child did have legal representation, thus 
the view of the child was present in the judgment, but was not part of the 
Board’s assessment of the case. In the two remaining cases, there was mention 
of the child’s spokesperson, but no mention of the child’s opinion. In one case 
(child aged nine years), the child had been offered a spokesperson but refused. 
In the second case (child aged seven years), the child did have a spokesperson, 
and the Board concluded that nothing the child had told the spokesperson 
would indicate that adoption would not be in the child’s best interest, without 
making any further mention of what the child’s views might have been. Thus, 
it would seem that this particular Board holds the view that the spokesperson’s 
task is to assess whether adoption would be in the child’s best interest, and not 
necessarily to ascertain the child’s views or opinions.
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5.3 Consent to Adoption
Children must by law consent to adoption when 12 years and older,6 and for the 
judgments in our sample, consent could have been provided by the child orally 
or in written form and we expect it to be mentioned by the County Board in the 
judgment. A total of 23 children in our sample should give consent, but for only 
three children was this mentioned in the County Board’s reasoning for its con-
clusion and in one case it was mentioned in the facts section of the case. For 21 
children, their views on adoption were presented (20 expressed a positive view 
on adoption), one had legal representation and one was absent from the Coun-
ty Board’s reasoning.
5.4 The Views of the Children
Out of the 73 children who had their views represented in the Board’s assess-
ment, almost all (n=70) expressed that they wished to be adopted. Two opin-
ions were neutral and one did not express a wish to be adopted if this meant 
reduced contact with the biological father. An example of the County Board’s 
characteristics of an opinion of a 15-year-old girl is the following:
She wants to be a full member of a family she is happy with, and who 
cares a lot for her. The security of living in a predictable home, and a fu-
ture with the people she appreciates, weighs heavily (NA42).
Another girl’s opinion, age nine years, was reiterated in the following way:
The child calls her foster parents mum and dad. I tell her that if they be-
come her adoptive parents, she will be their child forever. She says she is 
aware of this, and this is what she wants (NA75).
A boy’s view, age 15 years, was referred to like this:
The perhaps most important argument in favour of adoption, in this case, 
is still the boy’s clear and well-reflected wish to be adopted. He wants to 
be fully integrated into the family, take their name, and be like “other 
children” (NA145).
6 With the new law of 2017, it is specified that consent must be provided in writing, whereas 
the previous legislation of 1986 did not specify this requirement.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/02/2020 07:30:26AM
via University of Bergen
 651Children’s Capacities and Role
<UN>
international journal of children’s rights 28 (2020) 632-665
Quote from the child, age nine years, who did not wish to be adopted:
In his last conversation with the spokesperson, Child X expressed that he 
did not want to be adopted if this means a reduction in contact with his 
father. The County Board interprets this statement as an indication that 
continued contact with father is more important to Child X than adop-
tion (NA43).
5.5 Assigning Weight to the Child’s Opinion
The County Board has an obligation to give the child’s opinion due weight ac-
cording to the age and maturity of the child. We have found that a total of 73 
children’s views (41 per cent of the total sample) are included in the County 
Board’s reasoning, see Table 4 below, and of these the County Board states that 
they rely on the child’s view for 53 children (73 per cent) in their decision-
making. For 11 out of 73 children (15 per cent), the County Board does not men-
tion any weighing of the child’s view, and for 9 children out of 73 (12 per cent), 
the County Board states expressly that it will not assign the child’s opinion any 
weight.
Focusing on the 53 children for which the County Board relies on the child’s 
view, the County Board in most instances (n=34) just states that it will assign 
the child’s view weight, without specifying how much, as this quote about a 
nine-year-old child illustrates: ‘The child is nine years old, and the County 
Board has assigned his opinion weight’. The County Board can also express its 
reliance on the child’s opinion in a general way, as this quote about an eight-
year-old child illustrates: ‘The County Board relies on the fact that the child has 
spoken about adoption, both with the social worker and with the foster par-
ents.’ For 13 children, the County Board states that the child’s opinion is as-
signed a lot of weight, as these two illustrative examples about a 12-year-old 
and a 10-year-old, respectively, show:
Child X has stated his opinion in this case, as stated above. He wants to be 
adopted, and his wish will be assigned considerable weight (NA44).
According to the spokesperson, the Child has expressed that, ‘she would 
very much like to be adopted because then it will be for real, she is eager 
and repeats this several times’. The child sticks to this, even though this 
means stopping contact with the biological mother. The statement re-
lates naturally to the impression the child gives of her attachment to the 
foster family and her consciousness of her own situation there. In light of 
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this, the Board considers that her opinion should be assigned consider-
able weight, even though she is only ten years old (NA102).
For five children, their opinion is assigned some weight by the County Board, 
as this statement about an 8-year-old child illustrates:
The child has stated to the spokesperson that he wants to live with the 
foster parents until he is grown up. He wants someone to say that this is 
where he will stay. The board will assign this opinion some weight, due to 
the child’s age (NA106).
For 11 children, there is no mention by the County Board if the opinion is relied 
upon, as illustrated by the following quotes from a case about a six-year-old 
boy and an eight-year-old girl:
The boy has been appointed a spokesperson. In conversation with the 
spokesperson, the boy explained that he wants to continue to live in the 
foster home until he is an adult (NA16).
In conversation with the County Board members, the girl has stated that she 
wants to live with mum forever. She knows she is a foster child, but does not 
remember meeting her biological parents (NA101).
For nine children their opinion is not assigned weight by the County Board, 
either by explicit statement or because the opinion is devalued.
Table 4 Overview of the weight the County Board has given the opinion of the child. N=73 
children
Code Result Number of children % of N
The boards’ weighing 
of the child’s







Yes – a lot 14 19%
Yes – some 5 7%
Not mentioned 11 15%
No 9 12%
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We have already seen that age is an important marker for involvement, and 
there is a distinct difference in age groups as to the degree to which the Board 
will rely on the opinions of the children, see Table A in the Appendix. For the 
children that are aged four up to seven years old and the very few that had their 
views mentioned, just over half (n=7) of these were relied upon by the Board in 
their decision, whereas for the remaining (n=5), the assigned weight was not 
mentioned. None of these opinions were discarded by the Board.
In 23 per cent (n=9) of the decisions concerning children aged 7 up to 12 years 
old, the County Board discarded the child’s view. The County Board justified 
discarding all of these with the child’s lack of understanding of what adoption 
entails, even though the child indicated a positive attitude towards adop-
tion. This is illustrated by the following quotes:
The child’s opinion will be taken into account in view of the child’s age 
and maturity, cf. cwa Section 6-3. … The expert, Psychologist 1, has spo-
ken to Boy (8) about his views towards this case. Boy was very clear in that 
he wants to live in his current home, and he does not want to move to 
either of his biological parents. Psychologist 1 tried to explain to the boy 
the difference between adoption and a foster placement, but the Board 
finds that Boy did not understand the implications of this and that he did 
not express any clear views in relation to this. Boy expressed that contact 
with both parents is okay, and the amount of contact is fine (NA17).
Girl’s (seven) wish to stay in the foster home and to have the same last 
name as the foster family, will not be decisive. She stated where she want-
ed to live, not that she wanted to be adopted (NA21).
For the children aged 12 years or older, no opinions were disregarded by the 
Board, whereas for 2 (10 per cent), the County Board does not mention weigh-
ing the opinion, as the following quotes illustrate:
Girl (12) has told the spokesperson that she does not actually think she 
will have to move, but she is still afraid of this. She has repeatedly ex-
pressed a wish to be adopted by her foster parents in the last years (NA59).
Girl (12) has become more aware and has expressed a wish to be adopted 
by her foster parents. As the situation is today, she does not want contact 
with her grandmother. She does not want to be confronted by her grand-
mother with questions on why she wants adoption. She wants to see her 
biological brother (NA23).
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In sum, the County Board states that it assigns weight to the children’s opin-
ion for the majority of the children that have their view included, and in some 
judgments, the County Board also qualifies the weight given to the views of the 
child.
5.6 Characteristics of the Child and/or the Opinion and Correlated with 
the Weight given by the County Board
Examining if and what features and characteristics the County Board men-
tions when considering the weight to assign to the views of the included chil-
dren, we find three main areas of consideration (see Table 5): characteristics of 
the child, such as understanding, age, maturity, and the constitution of the 
child (if sick, disabled etc.); features of the opinion-formation process, includ-
ing if sufficient clarity around the opinion is displayed, no exercise of pressure, 
and sufficient information; finally, there is an emphasis on the opinion itself, if 
the opinion is rational and the opinion is in line with the best interest of the 
child. Although we cannot make a direct link between the impact of these vari-
ous characteristics and the decisions made, our findings show us that the char-
acteristics of the child are the most important factor (age, understanding, ma-
turity), and the other factors are mentioned much less.7 For the few decisions 
in which the County Board has explicitly assigned a great deal of weight to the 
child’s opinion (see Table 4 above), the County Board seems to focus on the 
quality of the opinion and the formation process, and less on various proxy 
terms such as age and maturity. From an example of an opinion that was as-
signed ‘considerable weight’ by the Board (in our coding scheme, this would 
equal ‘a lot of weight’), we see that the opinion is valued as well reasoned, 
strong, and held over time:
The girl (17) will turn 18 this year. She has a strong wish to be adopted by 
the foster parents. She has held this wish over a long period of time, and 
she has elaborated and accounted for this in meetings before the board. 
The board has assigned the girl’s wish considerable weight (NA134).
For the children where the Board simply states that it has assigned weight to 
their opinion, but not specified how much, we see a high emphasis on the 
child’s understanding. For these children, the Board points to their lack of un-
derstanding, or their limited understanding of the adoption question (n=10), 
and only two of the children are deemed to understand:
7 A detailed overview of all factors mentioned, by weight can be found in Table B in the 
Appendix.
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It may be doubtful whether she understands the full implications of what 
adoption entails, but the County Board’s assessment is nonetheless that 
she sees it as something positive, and a declaration of trust towards the 
foster parents (NA123).
In those cases where the opinion has only been assigned some weight, the em-
phasis is almost exclusively on age, more precisely that the child’s (young) age 
implies the opinion should be assigned less weight:
The child’s opinion should be assigned weight. The girl (8) has told the 
spokesperson that she wants to be adopted. Considering her age, the ma-
jority will not assign the child’s opinion decisive weight (NA80).
This is true for all five children whose opinion is assigned ‘some weight’. Four 
of these children were eight years old, and one was ten years old. While this is 
a very small sample, it is still interesting how the Board finds that these chil-
dren are of such a young age that their opinion should only be assigned some 
weight, especially because age alone is the conclusive factor.
In an example of an opinion in which the County Board does not mention 
whether it has assigned the opinion any weight, the emphasis is on whether 
the child has understood, with the conclusion that this has not been clarified – 
thus the Board finds no conclusive indicator of capacity:
In conversations with the spokesperson, the boy (seven) is clear that he 
wants to live in the foster home, without there being any further indica-
tion of whether he has understood the difference between adoption and 
a continued foster placement (NA122).
As in the example above, for the 11 children for whom it is not possible to deter-
mine if the County Board assigns weight to their views, only a few characteris-
tics are mentioned by the County Board. This includes the child’s understand-
ing (in one case, that the child does not appear to understand the difference 
between adoption and foster placement, in one case, that the child has shown 
consciousness around adoption); and that the opinion is consistently held over 
time. An example of the latter is a child aged 12 years: “The boy has expressed 
his wish to be adopted by his foster parents repeatedly over the years’ (NA59).
When the County Board disregarded nine children’s views, this was justified 
by their lack of understanding (eight out of nine children). In addition, age, the 
child’s maturity, clarity of opinion, or opinion formed under pressure, were 
mentioned by the County Board. By way of example:
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Table 5 Factors of importance when considering the child’s opinion and its weight. N=73 
children
Weight assigned to the  
child’s opinion
N=number of children
Factors the Board relies upon to assess the 
capacity of the child (in parentheses number 






Clarity of opinion/reflection (13)
Opinion held over time (10)
Child’s maturity (6)
Opinion is coherent/well thought out (6)
Sufficient information (4)
Whether opinion formed under pressure (3)
Features of the child/child’s constitution (2)











Clarity of opinion/reflection (1)
Whether the opinion is formed under pressure (1)
The board relies on the fact that the boy (seven) is immature for his age, 
and that he does not understand what adoption is in the actual and legal 
sense (NA79).
The girl (eight) had no clear perception of what adoption entails but clearly 
expressed that she belongs in the foster home and the network around them 
and that this is where she wants to grow up and belong (NA76).
5.7 The Sample of Cases not Resulting in Adoption
Five per cent of the cases did not result in an adoption, involving eight children 
ranging in age from four to nine years old. Five of these children did not have 
their views mentioned by the Board, of which two were four years old, one was 
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five, and one was six, and only for one of them did the County Board give a 
reason for excluding them: the child (aged four years) was too young. Three 
children aged six, seven and nine years, had their view mentioned by the 
Board. Two were positive towards adoption. The Board emphasised the child’s 
wish to have contact with the biological mother in one case (six years old), and 
the child’s lack of understanding of the adoption question in the second case 
(seven years old). The nine-year-old child was negative towards adoption, 
mainly due to concern that adoption would entail less contact with the bio-
logical father.8 The Board interpreted this as an expressed view that contact 
with the biological father was more important to the child than adoption, and 
concluded further that the child had not been sufficiently informed of the 
 consequences of adoption. The adoptive applicants, in this case, had, in fact, 
agreed to post-adoption contact.
6 Discussion
We are examining decisions that are of direct importance to the concerned 
children, namely, if they should be adopted or if they should continue to re-
main in public care. Findings from an English study reveal that many children 
are worried and highly concerned about these types of court proceedings 
(Thomas et al., 1999), and the importance for the children is clear as this state-
ment from one of the children shows: ‘I was worried whether I would be al-
lowed to get adopted or not. And if I was not, what would I do and where would 
I go?’ (Thomas et al., 1999: 69). Our analysis of all adoption cases concerning 
children four years and older over a six-year period reveals some interesting 
and intriguing findings.
First, young children do not have any type of agency in their own case. An 
overwhelming number of children have not had their capacity assessed and 
these children are more or less absent from the decision-makers’ consider-
ations and justification for the decision. Although it can be argued that on av-
erage, four-, perhaps five- and six-year-olds, often may not have the necessary 
capacity, this cannot be ex ante taken for granted. In our view, this finding 
shows a clear violation of the legal requirement that children’s capabilities to 
form an opinion should be the determinant of involvement. Similar findings 
have been shown in studies of care order decisions in the Norwegian County 
Boards (Magnussen and Skivenes, 2015), child protection frontline (Vis et al., 
2010), Swedish child protection (Heimer et al., 2017; Hultman et al., 2019), 
8 This was the only child found in our sample expressing a negative view towards adoption.
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as  well as in other countries (Berrick et al., 2019; Porter, 2019). The judicial 
 decision-makers have overall used the seven-year age limit to determine inclu-
sion of children and are thus behaving in the way the crc committee warned 
against. The discretionary authority delegated to the judiciary decision-makers 
to assess children’s capabilities has not been applied and, as a result, only a 
handful of the youngest children have had their capacity to form an opinion 
and to have agency in their case considered. Even though the crc is imple-
mented in Norwegian law, it is clearly not followed in practice. This also indi-
cates a lack of awareness that Article 5 of the crc is, in fact, relevant to 
 decision-makers and other authorities, and is not a duty placed on parents 
alone, despite the article’s wording. States, and by extension state authorities, 
have a duty to ensure that children are being supported in exercising their 
rights under the crc in accordance with their evolving capacities.
Second, and related to the first, our findings support previous research 
showing how the Norwegian justice system strongly relies on age as a proxy for 
maturity and competency in child protection cases (Magnussen and Skivenes, 
2015). Age is the main explanation for why children’s opinions are given weight, 
or the reason given in the few cases that children’s capacities are assessed and 
children are excluded. The use of an age limit in the law, although a guide, is 
probably the explanation for why most children aged seven years have their 
opinion mentioned in the judgments, while most children below this age do 
not. Other systems, as in the UK, do not set an age limit for children’s involve-
ment, and we recommend that Norway do the same.
Third, a deficit in regard to the consent criteria is revealed. Consent is a 
statutory requirement for children aged 12 years and older, and consent 
should  be mentioned in all the decisions that concern children in that age 
group. When only very few decisions mention consent – this is a concern. As to 
why consent is not a focus, we can only speculate. One possible explanation is 
that adoption is regulated both by the Child Welfare Act as well as the Adop-
tion Act. While  the Child Welfare Act and the Adoption Act have relative-
ly similar provisions in relation to the child’s opinion and involvement, only 
the Adoption Act mentions and requires the child’s consent after age 12 years. 
As cases under the Child Welfare Act make up most of the Boards’ caseload, 
they may not be as familiar with the requirements of the Adoption Act. It is 
possible that  decision-makers assume that the adoption application is in ac-
cordance with the child’s wishes. However, they still have a duty to ensure that 
proper procedure is followed, and everyone’s rights are protected. While one 
can also assume that any foster parent seeking to adopt wants to do so, adop-
tion decisions will nonetheless include a statement of the foster parents’ suit-
ability and wish, and the biological parents consent or objection (Helland and 
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Skivenes, 2019). This would indicate that nonetheless, adults’ rights, for exam-
ple to consent or object, are still taken more seriously than those of the child. 
Recently, a template has been introduced for decisions in adoptions from care 
that explicitly requires a check of consent from children aged 12 years or older, 
and we hope that this development can lead to greater awareness on this 
issue.
Fourth, the assessment of capabilities and the County Boards’ approach to 
children seem simplistic. This is evident when decision-makers are assessing 
children because either age or the child’s ability to understand is used as a 
proxy for maturity and competency. Only a few times do we find the County 
Board’s assessment of consistency and strength (see Archard and Skivenes, 
2009), and almost never is the child’s meaning formation process an issue. 
This may be a result of the limited information offered to the County Board 
to assess the ability of the child; information on whether the child was sub-
ject to pressure, or whether the child had sufficient information. Because 
the Board rarely meets the child, decision-makers will have limited opportu-
nity to seek additional information on the capacity of the child should they 
need it. However, it may also be due to a lack of focus and interest from the 
decision-makers because children’s involvement does not seem high on the 
agenda in child protection cases (Vis et al., 2010; Hultman et al., 2019; Por-
ter, 2019). A lack of guidelines and clear political aims to follow the crc are 
two likely explanations of why the system is like this. Furthermore, decision- 
makers may feel they lack competency to assess children’s capacity, and that 
lack of training on children’s development explains why there is a relatively 
low focus on children in these cases. However, we wish to point out that in 
the County Boards one of the decision-makers is an expert on children and 
their development, but we do not see this expertise reflected in the judgments. 
Possibly this is related to the working form of the County Boards, where the 
legal chair is responsible for organising and writing the judgments. However, 
the expert members have opportunities to bring in their viewpoints during 
the hearing process as well as into the written judgments, so possibly they 
also have a low focus on children in the cases. As we will return to below, the 
County Boards’ interaction with children has so far been indirect via a spokes-
person and the written material, and this is about to change from 2019 and 
onward.
Closely related, fifth, is the issue of what the child’s capacity is measured 
against. Although there are only a few children in our material in which the 
decision-makers provide information about how they have weighted a child’s 
opinion, it is sometimes clear that an opinion is disregarded because the issue 
of adoption and its legal implications is not understood (and possibly the 
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 decision-makers also believe this cannot be understood by children overall). In 
some other situations, it is the child’s opinion about his/her life situation and 
their wish to belong in the family that is considered. Thus, the County Boards 
vary in their perceptions of what the child should be providing their view 
about: some focus on the legal implications of adoption, others on the child’s 
view on their present living situation. Some decision-makers even indicate 
that it is a burden for children to be involved and that young children should 
be shielded from involvement without a further assessment of the child’s ca-
pacity and their right to have agency in their own case. This seems to be a dis-
enabling form of paternalism in the sense that it is not given a specific justifi-
cation for the paternalistic act. Possibly, the reason for this is the County 
Boards’ lack of information about the child. They rarely meet with the child 
directly, and the findings from our analysis show that the child’s views often 
are only briefly presented. However, the County Board has a choice to ask for 
more information, and they may extract it from the case files as well as from 
the spokesperson (see Enroos et al., 2017). While the County Board has a duty 
to ensure the child can participate and have their views heard, it is also a duty 
to consider the child’s best interest (see Archard and Skivenes, 2010 for a dis-
cussion of this, cf. also Hultman et al., 2019), and they likewise have a duty to 
protect the child from undue duties and burdens. This requires a type of pater-
nalism towards the child that is enabling, for example in the format that ex-
plicit and elaborate justifications are provided in terms of why an opinion is 
disregarded or why a child is not involved in the case.
Sixth, our analysis shows that in very few cases due weight to the child’s 
opinion is explained and elaborated on, and in the majority of the cases it is 
not specified. This is also detected elsewhere, as Daly (2018) points out a lack of 
common ground amongst decision-makers in terms of giving weight to chil-
dren’s opinion. In her view, the concept of ‘giving due weight’ has been an ob-
stacle to children’s participation, and has promoted decision-makers to give 
weight to opinions that concur with their opinion, and neglecting those that 
disagree. Training in providing reasons, and increased awareness on why and 
how an argument is important for a decision-making outcome, may be two 
solutions that the County Board may pursue (see Porter (2019)).
Our findings coincide with a notion of disenabling paternalism towards 
younger children, and a more enabling paternalism towards the older. Al-
though only indicative findings, younger children’s (below age 12 years) ability 
to form an opinion seems to be assessed by their age and their ability to under-
stand, while older children’s (12 years and older) ability seems to be judged by 
their capacity to form a well-reasoned and consistent opinion – i.e. qualities 
of  the decision-formation process, rather than simply features of the child. 
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A study of a representative sample of the populations in England and Norway 
reveals a significantly higher portion of the Norwegians being willing to act 
paternalistically towards children compared with the English population 
(Cappelen et al., in preparation).
7 Concluding Remarks
Our results are discouraging because overall children’s role and place in cases 
about adoption from care are minimal. These children are not given agency 
and they are not the main person in these cases. In itself, this raises a ques-
tion about legitimacy, and we doubt this would happen with an adult person’s 
case. We can conclude that the law is not followed and children’s rights as laid 
out in the crc are not respected, which is surprising and disappointing, bear-
ing in mind that the County Board is led by a lawyer and is a decision-making 
body operating as a court. However, new guidelines are in place for the Coun-
ty Boards, and involvement of children is not impossible nor difficult to realise, 
as there are very good examples of in our analysis and a point clearly made by 
Experts by Experience (2019). We end this paper with an excerpt from  the 
judgment about a 15-year-old child that we believe had agency in her case:
Something which in this case speaks especially in favour for adoption is 
Girl’s own strong wish to be adopted, as well as research indicating it is 
better for children to grow up as adoptive children rather than foster chil-
dren. Girl will soon turn 16 years old, and her opinion must weigh heavily. 
She has stuck by this wish over time. She is familiar with what adoption 
entails and has provided good reasons for her wish.
She wants to be a full member of a family she is happy with, and who 
cares a lot for her. The security of living in a predictable home, and a fu-
ture with the people she appreciates, weighs heavily (NA42).
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